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I.
THREE R’s - REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION, RECONCILIATION
There is no uniform use o f the three r's of post war rebuilding of society, economy and state - 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. Indeed an additional pair - resettlement and 
reintegration - are often substituted or added. This overlapping terminology may not matter 
much so long as in any context it is clear what is meant by the terms used.
In the present context rehabilitation (or rehabilitation and reconstruction) is seen as a 
strategic process focusing on seven imperatives:
1. rehabilitation of livelihoods enabling families to produce and to earn enough to meet 
basic household needs;
2. reconstruction of basic physical infrastructure in transport and communication as well 
as in basic rural and urban services;
3. recreation of basic market infrastructure - including institutions and enterprises - so that 
production and physical infrastructure can be used to generate household livelihoods, 
enterprise operations and social actor/state revenue flows;
4. reprovision (and usually fuller provision) of access to basic services especially law and 
order/security primarily via a user friendly civil police force and magistrates court 
system, primary and adult education, basic medical services (including preventative and 
educational, veterinary and agricultural extension and water;
5. rebuilding of institutional infrastructure (social capital) including family, lineage 
group, sub-clan, national and state which create forums for social and political relations 
based on mutual benefit, agreed norms and non-violent settling of tensions as well as 
providing more concrete benefits to - in return for performance of agreed obligations by - 
members;
6. achieving a sustainable set of macro economic relationships/balances in respect to 
external transactions, state fiscal/budgetary transactions and prices (supply/demand);
7. reinstituting safety nets/trampolines to provide for post war calamity (e.g. drought) and
catastrophe (heritages o f war including demobilisation into penury and land mines)
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impact lessening by interim support and to directing such support - e.g. via reintegration 
through training and labour intensive public works - to enabling beneficiaries to regain 
household livelihood and social community stability.
Neither rehabilitation nor reconstruction is to be taken as the literal replication of pre-war 
physical structures, institutions and relationships. These were rarely optimal and often 
contributed significantly to the war (or as the prettifiers of disaster term it, complex political 
emergency) catastrophe from which rehabilitation seeks to reconstruct and against whose re- 
emergence it seeks to ensure. However, many aspects of rehabilitation need to be begun 
promptly. Therefore reconstruction of key infrastructure e.g. Berbera harbour and urban 
water and - on the basis o f direct local consultation - schools, health posts and rural water 
should not be held up for long 'clean slate' physical planning optimality exercises. Neither 
should recreation of a civil police force and a civil service - law, order and other basic 
services are vital to households and their provision (or otherwise) is a key component in state 
legitimacy (or otherwise).
Rehabilitation has an economic core but is integrally linked to social recovery and 
reconciliation and to state reconstruction and recovery of legitimacy. The reason is quite 
simple - neither the household/social nor the nation/state imperatives of renewal after war can 
be achieved without enhanced access to material resources. The interactions are not one way.
Initially regaining law, order and justice as perceived by individuals - i.e. confidence in 
ability to go about ones daily business without violent or other coercive interference by 
anyone (bandits, dictators, troops, police or government officials) is crucial to reconciliation 
and to legitimacy. Achieving it requires trained, paid, provisional troops to meet - or 
preferably to deter - external threats and similarly training, facilities and pay are needed to 
have effective, user friendly police and magistrates. Commerce - especially international 
trade and in Somaliland its vital twin sister remittance flows from over the water - depends on 
law and order/security even more than on infrastructure. In turn state revenue depends to a 
large degree on restoration o f trade flows so that import and (less desirably) export duties can 
be levied.
A key rehabilitation (of livelihoods)/reintegration (into society) issue relates to ex­
combatants. To demobilise them into poverty and social exclusion with no trade except 
violence and no tool except the gun is not conducive to security nor to macroeconomic 
recovery. To 'warehouse' them I the army is expensive but may be less costly than risking 
their turning to self help violence (pure banditry or quasi ethnic raiding). Training plus 
public works focused phased demobilisation/reintegration (as in Zimbabwe) is probably the 
best route but one which is costly in terms of personnel and finance.
Macro Rehabilitation - Household, Sectors, Overall
Rehabilitation - like relief during war and repatriation after is usually perceived at micro 
(individual, household, small group) or intermediate (larger groups e.g. major refugee or 
displaced person camps or restoration of urban water supplies) and in survival/humanitarian 
terms. Overall macro approaches emphasising linkages, dynamics and priorities and 
the economic (production, exchange, external trade and fiscal flow) dimensions are 
frequently absent and virtually always sketchy.
In respect to unforeseen crises the saving of life and reduction of suffering require instant 
attention. If infant mortality among refugees exceeds 300 per 1,000 per year (well below 
levels recorded in Somalia in 1991-1992) the "grab, dab and jab" (providing shelter, handing 
out food, carrying out vaccination) is the immediate priority. For the dead there can be no 
rehabilitation. But even in the short term, and especially in the medium and long terms, lack 
of a macro overview, strategy and set of priorities is grossly inefficient and likely to lead to
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missed opportunities, inefficient use o f resources and - at best - faltering rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. These weaknesses are exacerbated when humanitarian micro support is 
fragmented among a plethora of external NGO's, government instrumentalities and 
international agencies pursuing uncoordinated, short term agendas with scant attention (but 
often grave damage) to rehabilitating the national social sector (ngo, kinship group, mosque) 
and state capacity and legitimacy.
Attempts to link micro humanitarian to strategic macroeconomic aspects o f 
rehabilitation/reconstruction have been rare - especially in any explicit systematic frame. 
Mozambique did articulate such a strategy in 1992 but could not convince donors that its 
proposition - based on analyses and projection of effects on other sectors, state revenue and 
expenditure and external trade - that centring on rural (and to a lesser extent urban) livelihood 
rehabilitation by the type of measures sketched above could produce rapid output and food 
security growth as well as massive household poverty reduction and at least some narrowing 
of fiscal and external imbalances. Unfortunately donors (including UNDP and the World 
Bank) did not so much reject it - let alone engage in dialogue on it - but treated it 
dismissively because it was so non-standard. In particular they did not consider seriously the 
proposition that over six years a gradually reducing proportion o f wartime domestic 
emergency and neighbouring country refugee support be redirected not to other countries (or 
home budget savings) but to rapid rehabilitation/reconstruction in Mozambique.
One reason the macro level has so little acceptance by external resource suppliers is the 
absence o f any substantial body of research or of domestic dialogue on the priorities, 
dynamics and interactions o f rehabilitation from household through national levels. The IDS 
(Sussex) - Leeds - Bradford - Accord COPE (Complex Political Emergency) project seeks 
both to contribute to the body of analysis available and to stimulate domestic dialogue in 
several rehabilitating societies/countries including Somaliland.
Macroeconomics of Rehabilitation: The Case of Somaliland
Macro economics is not about complex equations dependent on detailed, accurate multi year 
data series. That is econometrics which can be sectoral or micro just as much as macro.
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Nor is macro economics dependent on large bodies of detailed data nor even on complete 
national accounts. Its first fully recorded practitioner Aristotle (Confucius and Hammurabi 
are earlier, but the former is less systematic and the latter's surviving contribution - the legal 
code - is at best a cryptic guide to the implicit underlying analysis) specifically said that with 
such a subject and approach exactitude as to numbers or projections was not to be expected. 
The goal was approximate (but broadly correct) orders of magnitude, interactions and 
directions of movement. That is as true o f Somaliland today as of ancient Greece.
Accurate data is in short supply in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Somalia/Somaliland and 
most especially Somaliland (which has never had formal territorial accounts). In the case o f 
the former United Republic o f Somalia many official data (not all) were based on gross 
misunderstanding of macro economic structures and dynamics and were thus grossly 
misleading. Household income, remittances, external trade and the nature of commerce were 
among the series with gross errors as elucidated both by Valli Jamal of the ILO and the 
present author in a 1987 study.
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But this is not to say no data - both fragmentary quantitative and more qualitative - exist. 
They do. From them orders o f magnitude, interactions and trends can be pieced together. In 
Somalia: Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, Poverty Pockets, Volatile Vulnerability and 
Public Pauperisation, Vali Jamal and the present author conducted such an exercise for the 
then United Republic o f Somaliland. It indicated severe underestimation of grain and 
livestocks production, of remittances and of external trade. It also showed that absolute 
poverty in Somalia was lower than supposed. But it also revealed that governmental services 
in the core health, education, water and extension areas had virtually collapsed, that pay for 
public servants was so low as to enforce non-attendance/non-honesty, that counterproductive 
exchange control and tax policies were reducing public revenue by up to three quarters and 
that most aid expenditure was so structured/so inefficient as to be of limited value to Somalis. 
Those patterns - with some shifts including very different govemmenl priorities - continue in 
Somaliland. Household survival and often modest security at personal consumption level 
combine and contrast with public sector line and contrast with public sector pauperisation. 
The major difference - which is parametric to (that is part o f the operating context for) macro 
economics is in respect to state legitimacy/household security. By almost any test the Barre 
regime was illegitimate and security (for ordinary people) collapsing in 1987 especially in 
Somaliland. The reverse process has been achieved over 1991-1998 in Somaliland. Security
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spending may still eat up most of the budget but at least there is user friendly security for 
most Somalilanders and a state committed to protecting and providing basic services to them.
Four key macro areas will be explored briefly with notes as to economic reality and public 
policy implications: Population, Domestic Product (Territorial Production) and National
Product (Income), External Trade and Public Sector (Government broadly defined) 
revenue/expenditure.
The population of Somaliland is of the order of 2,000,000, while the global population o f 
Somalilanders - including refugees, overseas term workers and diaspora - is probably about
2,650,000. This analysis is based on the suppressed 1986 Swedish census preliminary data 
projections - including war excess deaths from malnutrition, stress and loss of medical access 
- and very rough estimates o f refugees, overseas term worker and diaspora (categories which 
overlap at their margins) changes since 1986. (See Annex A).
O f the two million about 15% reside in Hargeisa, 10% in other cities and towns, 30% to 35% 
in agro pastoral (defined as over 20% crop share in crop plus livestock production - basically 
Borama - Hargeisa belt plus pockets elsewhere) and 40% to 45% in pastoral areas. This 
distribution shows a continuing shift to urban areas and especially to Hargeisa which was 
perhaps 25,000 at independence in 1960, and probably from pastoral to agro pastoral. 
Because o f limited urban production/employment possibilities and of cultivable lands no 
rapid shifts are likely in the next decade.
The distribution points to a policy priority (never met satisfactorily and especially unmet 
since the end of the British colonial/self government period) - provision of water, veterinary 
service, health and education access to the pastoral (nomadic and/or seasonally mobile) 
population. If virtually half of Somalilanders have no access to public services beyond peace 
both economic and political questions/shortcomings necessarily arise.
The Gross Territorial Product (Domestic Output) of Somaliland is of the order of $600-650 
million or $300-325 per capita - in the lower half of the middle third of sub-Saharan African 
states and above Ethiopia and Eritrea. Very real comparability problems exist in SSA GDP 
data measured in market exchange rate $ prices, but the conclusion that Somaliland is poor 
but not among the poorest (at least in output and personal consumption terms) African 
countries appears valid.
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%The makeup of GDP is dominated by livestock and crops and by transport and commerce 
related to their sale and to that of imports financed livestock exports and remittances.
Livestock and products value to producers in terms of sale and household production 
consumed by the households is of the order o f $165 million with its domestic component o f 
$70 million odd probably almost half milk and ghee (the key cash earning source for poor 
agro pastoral households as well as a substantial one for pastoralists - primarily from cattle 
and camels respectively). Agricultural (crop) value is perhaps $90 million dominated by 
khatt (the key crop for middle and upper income agro pastoral households) and grain (where 
both household study data and national food balance consumption estimates less imports 
suggest 150,000 tonnes production for sale and household use not the less than one third as 
high projections based on the old URS underestimates o f sold crop output). Fishing and 
charcoal plus building pole (forestry) output is small but significant to some coastal villages 
and escarpment towns/villages.
Manufacturing (largely repair) mining and utility (water and electricity) production and valuei
added in construction are modest, probably under $50 million in total of which over half in 
construction.
Services are dominated by commerce and transport linked to marketing domestically and for 
export o f livestock and crops and to marketing of imports and handling of transit/entrepot 
trade to Region 5 of Ethiopia. Together with government sector value added (basically 
wages and emoluments) these total over $300 million or virtually 50% o f GDP.
These proportions are in general not very unusual for a middling poor SSA economy albeit 
manufacturing and construction are moderately and government services radically below 
typical proportions. However, Somaliland's economy is very atypical in one respect - 
remittances. In part this is a long standing flow from merchant communities abroad (initially 
largely in East Africa) and from overseas workers (including at least from the 1600's seamen 
- then those of the British East Africa company and Arab traders). However it rose 
dramatically in the 1970's with the rapid growth of employment "over the water" in the 
Arabian Peninsula and especially Saudi resulting from their petroleum fuelled growth and 
more recently from the North American, European and Arabian Peninsula professional and 
commercial diaspora. In 1987 Jamal and Green estimated actual remittances as of the order 
of $500 million (versus an official figure of under $20 million which represented transfers via
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banks) for the then United Republic. By 1995 there was reason to believe restoration o f 
commercial channels and o f peace had restored pre 1988 remittance levels of Somaliland but 
no clarity as to what that level was.
1998 sample estimates of commercial, exchange agency and personally carried remittances 
by I. Ahmed and others came to about $500 million with the last category (which is hardest to 
estimate) the largest and with the "over the water sources" perhaps half the total and the old 
community and new diaspora sources o f equal total importance. Assuring 1987 Somaliland 
remittances to have been $150 million, the insecure conditions to have blocked $25-50 
million more and 1987-97 inflation to have been 60%, then $500 million suggests a real 
growth of remittances o f about 50% which is not implausible. The Northern diaspora is now 
both larger and in part established and able to remit more, while numbers of Somaliland (as 
opposed to total foreign) workers "over the water" have probably increased moderately.
Various estimates associated with UNDOSS/UNDP-Nairobi o f as low as $4 million bear no 
relation to reality. The nearly $100 million Ministry of Planning estimate covers primarily 
money transfer agencies - one of three main channels and probably the smallest - and is 
therefore realistic but incomplete.
Gross National Product (actually Income in normal words) is therefore o f the order o f 
$1,150 million or $575 per capita - the upper end of the middle third of SSA countries. This 
is a conclusion not inconsistent with observed as well as survey estimated personal 
consumption, nutrition and absolute poverty levels.
However a serious interpretation problem arises. Khatt at retail price probably accounts for 
$250 million o f consumption. This is quite disproportionate to the cigarettes/beer (the closest 
analogue) share in other SSA countries and implies poverty and malnutrition levels are higher 
in Somaliland than might be expected at $575 per capita income and relatively low (perhaps 
$60-75 per month for a household o f six or seven) absolute poverty budget levels.
The $575 per capita income appears to be used about 85% on personal (household) 
consumption, 5% on public consumption, 5% on public consumption and 10% on investment. 
Those proportions are unusual in that investment is low (partly because net inflow of 
external resources other than remittances is 2/4% of GDP versus up to 10 times as high for 
several poor SSA economies, but also because plant, equipment and infrastructure investment 
is very low) and public consumption under half the typical share because of very limited
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revenue collection and equally limited external assistance - the latter in large measure a result 
o f non-recognition.
These estimates (See Annex B) show considerable continuity - more accurately recovery to 
or even above pre 1987 levels. In particular they underline the continued pauperisation o f 
public services which began after the disastrous Ogaden War adventure by the Barre Regime. 
The lower investment proportion compared to the URS of 1987 is, however misleading. 
Present Somaliland had disproportionately low investment and in any case the purpose of 
much investment was to provide payoff to Italian enterprises and occult forces and rake-offs 
to favoured Somalis with predictable negative impact on their real value to Somalia.
Almost all o f these estimates are subject to significant margins of error. But no plausible re­
estimation would alter the livestock/milk - khatt/grain - transport/commerce - remittances 
interpretation of the economy nor force massive alteration in the personal consumption level 
estimates. Nor could it alter the realities of very low public sector services (especially 
beyond security/law and order) relative to personal consumption and of levels o f fixed 
investment so low and skewed as to raise doubts as to future growth potential (reinforcing 
those arising from the very low "human investment" in health and education and therefore in 
labour productivity).
External accounts (Annex C) pose problems because o f undervaluation (to avoid taxation) 
and the commingling of Somaliland external trade with Region 5 exports and imports 
transiting Somaliland. However, the broad order of magnitude o f exports o f goods, 
transit/entrepot earnings and remittances is $75 million and o f aid in terms of 
purchases/payments in Somaliland plus imports (e.g. drugs, food) for use by Somalilanders 
$25 million. That implies goods imports of the order of $650 million (of which $150 million 
khatt) and of services plus profits of foreign (dominantly Arab and non-Somalilander Somali) 
enterprises o f $50 million.
These results highlight several points:
a. Somaliland is not short o f import capacity relative to national income;
b. The Balance o f Payments is more or less balanced;
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%c. The chief barriers to investment are low domestic savings and low deployment of 
remittances to investment plus limited professional/technical capacity beyond commerce, 
road transport and repair not lack o f import capacity;
d. Even were aid at 'normal' (for a poor SSA economy of 2,000,000) levels o f $50 million or 
at the upper end o f the range at $100 million, this would not radically alter import 
capacity although it could enable much greater public expenditure on basic service 
provision and infrastructure reconstruction and development;
e. The 'collapse' o f the Somaliland shilling from SS50 = $1 to SS3,900 = 1 does not flow 
from chronic structural external imbalance.
At first glance, and in general outside comment, Somaliland is characterised by rapid 
inflation caused by rapid expansion of currency supply through deficit financing and by a 
complex multiple rate exchange system operated to benefit the state and the Central Bank 
at the expense of traders and export producers. These impressions are relatively to grossly 
misleading.
At the real (Hargeisa money changes/Jiddah bazaar) rate of about SS3,900 = $1 the total 
Somaliland currency in circulation is $12.5 million or 1% of gross national product. Given 
the absence of a normal banking system -  and therefore cheque payments -  and the limits on 
Central Bank and merchant means to make/receive payments by transfers without the 
physical use o f notes, it is inconceivable circulation of currency (Somaliland and other) is 
less than $60 million and -  including hoarding -  it could be up to $120 million. What fills 
the gap -  the USA $. Somaliland currency is the small change and USA notes the basic 
currency. Because this means that the Somaliland economy has made a permanent interest 
free loan to the USA probably exceeding $50 million and perhaps as high as $100 million, 
dollarisation is cause for concern. But it cannot be reversed by law, only by building up 
confidence in the shilling which will take time and includes continuation o f the very 
restricted issue of additional notes which has stabilised the exchange rate for the past year 
and a half.
Because the economy is dollarised, the true nature of inflation is revealed by comparing 
dollar prices (at the market rate) over time. In fact it is very low -  improvements in trade
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efficiency and in security have virtually offset dollar inflation to leave consumer prices quite 
stable (apart from weather and Saudi embargo shocks) at least since mid-1995. This is 
clearly understood by the Ministry o f Planning.
The multiple exchange rates -  to the limited extent they can be enforced -  penalise 
exporters, remitters and visitors who exchange at the SSI,500 = $1 rate and benefit those who 
have access to Central Bank funds to import at SS650 or 1,500 to the $. They grossly reduce 
government revenue (from export duty and charges and from customs) because the goods are 
valued in $ and then the SS amount due is computed at SSI,500 -  not SS3,900 -  to the $.
The Central Bank avoids losses in SS650 = $1 transactions and covers its expenses by selling 
some dollars on the market at the SS3,900 rate. Because the chief losers are the state on 
undercharging of taxes and pastoralists on underpayment for livestock, the faster the 
foredoomed effort to maintain artificial rates is scrapped by movement to a unified market 
determined rate the better. Such a shift is in fact endorsed by the Central Bank but perhaps 
not with an adequate sense of urgency and priority. The Central Bank cannot sustain an 
unreal rate (nor with negligible resources even intervene to smooth out fluctuations) and the 
cost o f pretending to do so is probably $25 million loss of state revenue and (depending on 
resultant undervaluation and non-collection) $ 10 million to $ 15 million pastoralist income 
since merchants base their buying prices on what they will receive and pay less if it is SS 
1,500 to the $ (plus additions from undervaluation of exports at Berbera with related 
payments in Jeddah) not the Saudi market price less costs of taxes and transport.
Public sector accounts (Government and local Government Budget outturn plus those of 
some statutory authorities not perceived as state owned service and/or goods production 
enterprises) have traditionally been perceived as among the areas o f more reliable SSA 
statistics. This was never wholly valid and has become increasingly less so since 1980. Off 
budget transactions (including aid in kind not properly entered as aid revenue and programme 
expenditure) have risen, consolidated local government and also statutory body accounts are 
often not available or not consolidated, direct donor or donor via NGO (or secondarily 
domestic ngo) programmes in varying degrees coordinated with or substituted for 
governmental programmes have proliferated, bookkeeping entry and accounting 
consolidation and analysis standards have deteriorated (in the former URS to the extent that 
by 1987 half of all original entries were either unintelligible or inaccurate partly to
11
#camouflage ‘security’ and occult or corrupt uses but also substantially from 
bookkeeping/accounting breakdown).
The Somaliland Government Budget as kept by the Ministry o f Finance is a serious document 
and the accounts resulting from it are kept with some care and accuracy to control and to 
ensure propriety o f fund uses. Unfortunately it is so incomplete a representation of public 
sector accounts as to be as often misleading as enlightening for macro economic purposes.
The reasons are multiple:
1. many expenditures have been handled directly by the Central Bank (largely out o f tax 
revenue deposited with it) — notably uniformed services rations, the largest single 
expenditure item. As a result neither the spending nor the revenue appears on Ministry 
accounts;
2. while the payment o f operational expenditure by the Central Bank for the Ministry of 
Finance largely out of government revenue has been phased out, the Central Bank still 
deducts from revenue to pay off instalments on official but not systematically analysed 
past government borrowings from merchants which have now been transferred to the CB 
so neither debt stock, debt amortisation nor total revenue data are transparent;
3. some government imports are changed at SS650=$1 (presumably including food for 
uniformed services) and some at SSI,500 = $1 so that converting budget SS data to $ at a 
uniform SS3,900 market rate is seriously misleading;
4. consolidated local government and statutory authority (e.g. cities, urban water, airport, 
mines, disarmament, port) data are not readily available;
5. Substantial aid expenditure is (largely but not wholly because of non-recognition) 
handled outside government accounts even when it is part o f government programmes 
(e.g. UNICEF provision of drugs, vaccines and specific project payments to health staff) 
or is so closely coordinated with it as to be arguably governmental support (e.g. much 
rural water spending, some UNHCR quick impact projects, much of the mines and ports 
statutory authority support).
A rough estimate of public sector spending in 1997-98 (basically before the Saudi 
sheep/goat ban) is $50 million. (See Annex B). Of this about $20 to $25 million represents
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government pay and allowances (dominated by uniformed service food, uniforms and 
quarters), $7.5 to $10 million local government and statutory authority spending; $5 million 
aid to government programmes handled via government but off budget and $10 to $15 
million aid channelled via statutory bodies or in government and international agency plus 
NGO/ngo programmes linked closely enough to Ministry priorities as to be arguably 
governmental.
Revenue sources would appear to be about $15 to $17.5 million aid; $6 to $7.5 million user 
charges, fees and licenses; $6 to $7.5 million export duties and charges and; $17.5 to $22.5 
million import duties; $2 to $2.5 million other. It is unclear whether domestic borrowing rose 
or fell -  a range of plus to minus $2.5 million appears plausible while net currency issuance 
was nil or negligible.
The make-up of expenditure appears to be 50% defence; 12.5% law and under (police, 
prisons, courts); 12.5% other civil service -  local government -  statutory authority pay and 
allowances; 25% all other (e.g. books, drugs, transport, pumps and spares, machinery and 
spares, office equipment and supplies). Counting allowances the uniformed services may pay 
$60-75 a month (i.e. room, clothing, food and -  effectively -  pocket money) as may many 
local government and statutory authority posts. But because o f the collapse o f the SS vis a 
vis the dollar the intended $100-$500 a month and initial <xtual $50-$250 a month civil 
service pay scales have fallen to $4-$20 a month which is derisory even by SSA standards.
Numbers of employees over 6,000 civil service, 4,000 odd local government and statutory 
authorities, 5,000 civil police (Internal Ministry), 500-1000 custodial (prisons) service 
(Ministry of Justice) and 7,000 army (Ministry of Defence). The last includes 5,000 to be 
trained as a lean and mean border defence/serious provincial disobedience reaction forces and 
12,000 former militia members in practice warehoused because to demobilise them into 
primary would be dangerous as they would have no livelihoods but access to guns.
These are the weakest data estimates compared to population, production, remittances and 
external trade. They may be 50% above actual levels. However, there is little chance that 
they underestimate. Therefore, they point toward the following conclusions:
1. to staff a government service able to deliver universal basic services would require about
20,000 non uniformed civil servants including local government -  dominantly school
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$teachers, nurses, veterinary and agricultural extension workers and water technicians,
6,000 police and prisons service and 5,000 army;
2. assuming $50 to $500 monthly pay scales and a focus on efficient basic service provision, 
the annual budget needed would be of the order of $150 to $200 million (including 
repairs, maintenance, public infrastructure works);
3. if  customs were collected at market exchange rates on all imports with rates of 33%
(50%) for khatt; 25% for tobacco, petroleum products, soft drinks and electrical/video 
appliances and accessories and 10% for all other imports that could yield $115 million 
($140 million);
4. that customs revenue could reasonably be augmented by $10 million in size related 
license fees, $10 million in user charges and fees, $10 million in land and building rates 
in urban areas and $10 million in taxes per 10 khatt bushes taking domestic revenue to the 
order of $150 ($180)million or comparable to expenditure needed;
5. additional government channelled aid could be $25 million or conceivably up to $50 
million excluding technical assistance -  a sum much smaller than uncollected or unlevied 
tax potential;
6. without massive fiscal restructuring to tax to spend health, education, water, extension 
and infrastructure to complement and to build on security and law/order/justice cannot be 
provided and both future output and household income growth and future state security 
and legitimacy will be put at risk.
From Macro Economics to Policy Priorities
The household income and poverty, personal consumption, external balance, remittance and -  
less uniformly production aspects o f the Somaliland economy are in reasonably good shape, 
have recovered to or above pre-war levels and have at least modest growth possibilities.
However, there are exceptions to these macro generalisations:
a. poverty7 products exist especially among uneducated urban de-mobilisees; agro-pastoral 
households with neither khatt nor substantial (at least 2 to 3 million milking cows)
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mil/ghee sales; pastoral households with less than 100 sheep or goats especially if  also 
without any milking camels; disabled persons; female headed households with several 
mouths (usually children) to feed, only one earning pair of hands and no helping hand 
remittances;
b. broader groups are vulnerable to natural calamities (e.g. drought) and catastrophes (e.g. 
FAO’s false identification of Somaliland as Rift Valley Fever infested and Saudi’s -  at 
least partly understandable -  over-reaction) albeit their impact is cushioned for remittance 
receiving households;
c. industry (manufacturing-construction) is very limited in development as is full scale 
electricity generation partly as a result o f lack of experience and professional skills and 
partly because at least large scale projects (e.g. 100 km or more mechanised highway 
construction, Berbera Cement rehabilitation, a Hargeisa wide electricity generating and 
distribution enterprise) are beyond the present resource mobilisation limits o f Somaliland 
capitalists;
d. investment beyond housing commercial buildings and -  less clearly -  vehicles is very 
low not merely in public infrastructure but also enterprise sector plant and equipment;
e. longer term growth of production and income probably depends on diversification of 
production as there are limits to crop and livestock potential especially in the absence o f 
effective research, veterinary and extension services;
f. at over 40% of GNP remittances are high raising dependence/vulnerability issues but 
these can be overstated. Somalilanders’ overseas jobs are not particularly unstable and 
the loyalties (and plans to return) behind other remittance flows appear unlikely to 
weaken much over the next decade or more. Nor is Somaliland unique -  the Philippines 
has perhaps four million overseas workers and semi- to fully-permanent diaspora from 
construction workers through seamen and nurses to professionals and business persons 
and at least $10,000 million (perhaps $12,500 million) in annual remittances which in 
absolute per capita terms (though not in proportion of GNP) is comparable to Somaliland 
and has remained stable or risen over the past decade.
However, the public sector gives far greater grounds for concern. Beyond security and law
and order (vital but not by themselves enough) it remains pauperised and unable to
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provide basic services or physical infrastructure it is quite unrealistic to suppose the 
enterprise sector can or will provide nor that the domestic social sector can extend to most 
Somalilanders without substantial state funding. These failings are of concern at household, 
enterprise and macro economic level. Access to education, to health, to water and to 
extension/veterinary services -  o f useable quality and moving toward universal access -  
matter to Somaliland households (especially poor ones) for economic as well as social and 
overall welfare reasons. They also matter to enterprises and the overall economy because 
unless they can be broadened and deepened domestic market growth will be dependent 
largely on remittance growth, labour productivity will stagnate and infrastructure related crats 
will remain high (e.g. the annual loss of time and added wear and tear to vehicles diverting 
around wrecked bridges on the Hargeisa-Boramo-Hol Hoi highway almost certainly exceeds 
the total cost o f their rehabilitation).
The key constraints on public sector rehabilitation/reconstruction are:
1. inadequate tax revenue.;
2. inadequate numbers and qualifications of public sector personnel;
3. the gap in education and recruitment since the mid-1970s which implies high replacement 
requirements for middle and senior level civil servants;
4. the derisory civil service pay levels which in practice close down ministries by noon, 
make many public servants dependent on remittances, encourage the corruption of need 
(not excessively greed) by those with services (whether nursing, access to a minister or 
non-collection o f taxes) to sell to substitute for the living wage they are not paid;
5. the limited -  and historically broken (in 1960 and again in the mid-1980s) Somaliland 
experience with public sector planning, service provision administration and public 
service structuring;
6. the low levels and unfortunately fragmented and government bypassing levels of external 
resource transfers and of technical assistance resulting from inaccurate Stage 4 insecurity 
classification and diplomatic non-recognition.
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Some Specific Policy and Programme Implications
The generally favourable short term household and enterprise sector production/income
outlook combined with vulnerability to shocks and need to improve labour and overall
productivity and to diversify and provide, as noted, a set of priorities for the public sector:
a. health-education-extension to build up human capital and productivity;
b. more environmental and other agricultural/pastoral resource studies to establish both 
baseline facts and to explore potential improvements user viability and user friendliness 
(which can sometimes be delegated to ngo’s/NGO’s e.g. improved stores and charcoal 
processing technology)
c. infrastructure -  especially highways, secondary roads, harbour and perhaps Hargeisa and 
Berbera electricity as well as rural water -  restoration and enhancement to increase access 
and to reduce costs. Electricity for major cities is provisionally listed because small 
generator capacity for major users and limited networks is workable and exists but is high 
cost compared with single, longer thermal plants and urban (or even Hargeisa-Borama) 
distribution systems. The latter are probably beyond the present scope o f the Somaliland 
enterprise sector.
d. sustaining and improving law and order;
e. more extensive professional level official involvement in drought/food balance projection 
and proactive response framing and in Red Sea-Gulf-East African littoral veterinary 
monitoring and analysis to reduce risks o f ill founded embargoes and to link to 
international crisis response mechanisms;
f. provision o f information to potential domestic producers on opportunities/technologies -
e.g. simple pure water production/bottling at, say Sheikh to substitute for Yemen 
Highland water from Hodeida and to potential large (external) investors e.g. on 
incomplete Berbera cement plant - at a level allowing interested parties to go forward 
themselves to more specific, in-depth studies; together with;
g. In principle, recreating or rather encouraging recreation o f a commercial banking system. 
This is a desideratum but it is doubtful Central Bank advocacy before initial commercial 
bank interest (probably from Djibouti or Addis bases) arises.
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IThe listing o f a variety o f enabling actions by the state as important to the sustainable and 
sustained development o f the macro economy places public revenue generation at the top o f 
the priority list. Both sustaining law-order-security and providing infrastructure-basic 
services regime very substantial augmentation of public sector revenue. The broad 
parameters o f what is needed and potentially attainable have been sketched above.
Some specifics include:
1. Restructuring Customs including securing technical assistance on how to improve 
coverage, set rates, value imports quickly but at least approximately accurately, train 
staff, establish more professional rules and regulations and staff structures;
2. As a necessary condition pay Customs staff $50 to $500 a month (with other civil 
servants to follow out o f enhanced revenue when achieved). The old Swahili adage that 
the tax collector is always paid, the only question is whether he is paid by the state or by 
the merchant who does not pay taxes sums up the reason this is a priority action;
3. Abolish use of non-market exchange rates in tax assessment and collection. The issue is 
partly transparency but more crucial than and valuing imports in $ and converting at
SS 1,500 = $1 when the true rate is SS3,900 amounts to a discount/leakage of revenue of 
over 60%;
4. Phase out export taxes and charges (other than those necessary for the commercial 
operation o f the port and of export linked veterinary and quarantine services) because 
they have both distorting (valuation, routing) and negative (lower earnings) impact;
5. Avoid any taxation of remittances as it would either hide or reduce them to no point- 
import duties in practice can tax their use more easily and effectively;
6. Halt municipal import/sales taxes in return for ending central government graduated 
license fees which would become a purely local government area o f revenue;
7. Encourage local government taxation of urban plans and buildings on a value related 
basis;
8. Probably tax domestic khatt on an annual levy per 10 plants basis.
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IDomestic revenue enhancement is the first priority because it is potentially larger, is essential 
to using foreign resources effectively, is within Somaliland’s control and is dependence 
reducing/self confidence and respect enhancing. That is not to say external relationships and 
resources are unimportant nor that selected actions in respect to them are not priorities to be 
pursued in parallel with domestic public sector revenue rehabilitation and enhancement. Nor 
is it to overlook that forward planning on the uses of revenue sketched above will be another 
parallel priority -  just as the best allocation plans are useless without resources to allocate so 
revenue arising without effective allocation will be useless -  or worse as misallocation on the 
scale o f the late Barre regime corrodes legitimacy and builds up heritages of bad habits and 
distorted institutions.
Part o f the case for foreign contacts is building up working linkages and knowledge that 
Somaliland exists and is relevant to doing business to a broader community than 
humanitarian agencies, the Somali diaspora and present trade contacts. Specific potential 
gains are air services by internationally linked carriers (e.g. Ethiopian), an investor to 
complete and run a 150,000/400,000 tonne 75% plus export cement plant at Berbera (e.g. 
Kenya Bamburi or its European shareholders or a South African company) while general 
might include a Commonwealth Development Corporation unit providing technical advice, 
training and capital to assist in medium scale enterprise development.
But while aid (soft loans/grants/technical assistance) by itself will never develop Somaliland 
and even on optimistic (additional $25 to $50 million a year) projections it is much less than 
domestic fiscal potential, foreign resource generation at higher levels for restructured uses is 
a priority.
The four priorities set out here are designed to allow rapid action in respect to four national 
priorities while domestic revenue is built up and to build a base for further and broader 
development of international linkages.
1. a joint Ethiopia-Somaliland project for rehabilitation and upgrading of the Port of 
Berbera, the Berbera-Hargeisa-Hol Hoi highway and related transport routes to Jigjiga 
and Addis. The value to both countries in respect to transit traffic and to each in respect 
of domestic commerce is evident and both design and execution would be fairly simple. 
The European Union has unused Regional (two or more country) funds budgeted for the
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IHorn. A joint approach by Ethiopia and Somaliland (which does appear to qualify even 
in EU terms as a regional-provincial-government) should be able to unlock these;
2. two linked Demobilisation/Rehabilitation programmes under National Demobilisation 
Commission auspices one linked to the Ministry of Defence and one to Sayaal could 
benefit - say - 6,000 non-reintegrated present demobilisees and the 12,500 odd 'surplus' 
army personnel over - say - 5 to 6 years. What is needed are two year training (carpentry, 
masonry, vehicle repair, plumbing, civil engineering) linked to labour intensive building 
programmes. With annual intake of 2,000 in the Ministry and 1,000 in the Sayaal 
programme these could be an analogue to Zimbabwe's largely successful demobilisation 
programme for the participants and free the state of the cost of maintaining ex-militia 
army personnel because throwing them out into penury and exclusion would be very 
dangerous to security and to peaceful economic progress. The ILO has experience with 
cost efficient labour intensive works and with training the WFP has food to use in support 
o f such programmes, the EU has Echo money for peace consolidation activities. The 
Ministry has the will to demobilise, Sayaal has some experience with training, most o f the 
men involved would accept programmes that paid wages and led to respected 
occupational (employed or self employed) livelihood opportunities thereafter. Areas of 
activity include road/bridge rehabilitation and building (e.g. a new Hargeisa-Burao 
highway parallel to the mined one if the cost and time constraints make literal 
rehabilitation impracticable), reafforestation (if appropriate species are known or can be 
identified promptly), rural schools and clinics, urban infrastructure including water 
distribution;
3. linkage to international drought and other disaster relief networks so that Somaliland 
warnings (which can be relatively early because 2 or more bad rains are needed to cause 
disaster) are received and put on action lists and viable food for work/work for food (food 
sold and cash paid to workers) projects stock - piled to allow output providing/self respect 
preserving alternatives to handouts to be the main assistance channel;
4. technical assistance desired and prioritised by Somaliland in three key areas:
i. for participation in regional technical and professional bodies (e.g. veterinary) to 
build up links permitting early response to problems and use of opportunities and 
to build a base for broader/deeper cooperation (a role which was very significant
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Iin the early years o f the Southern African Development Community's predecessor 
SADCC);
ii. design, training and initial staffing assistance for key projects/institutions e.g. 
Customs, Ministry o f Planning, Civil Service Commission);
iii. rapid build-up of analytical, strategic and articulated planning/design and 
monitoring capacity - even in advance of physical implementation capacity - to 
allow national strategic prioritisation and its coordinated implementation via 
government, donor, NGO and (domestic) ngo and social actor groups. Evident 
cases are Water (especially rural water), Health and Education. This would entail 
external financing o f Somaliland personnel via the projects which while neither 
long term sustainable nor desirable would be a useful 3 year interim measure.
Among the areas for strategic review are para medical and para veterinary services for
pastoralists with state training o f lineage group or pastoral band chosen personnel, provision
)
of an initial basic drug kit with refills from accessible points at cost (or subsidised) plus 
monitoring and refresher training and community payment of the workers. These are not 
trendy or untested daydreams - such services operated well with substantial pastoralist access 
in late 1940's and 1950's. British Somaliland the medical one was partially restored under 
UNICEF leadership in the 1980's. They cannot - especially initially - provide full primary 
health or veterinary services but they can deliver substantial ones and the real alternative for 
pastoralists is not fully professional clinics and veterinary pasts but rather nothing. Similarly 
the long talked about development o f Koranic school/primary school linkages should - like 
the para programmes - be pursued to pilot stage to provide base experience and guidelines for 
future expansion. In each case government and social actor involvement is key so that a 
direct donor (whether UNICEF or ngo) scheme bypassing the relevant Ministry would be 
inherently flawed.
It is tempting to add micro credit ($50 to $1,000 loans for small livelihood generation from 
tea stalls and dressmaking to small building construction and core pastoral herd purchase) but 
this is a field in which experience elsewhere counsels for channelling via social groups with 
more personal and immediate loyalty links than a state or standard financial system entity.
The appropriate Somaliland entities would appear to be women's groups (which have limited 
but generally positive experience) and perhaps lineage groups. The ultimate initial funders
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Iwould be aid agencies (e.g. USAID, DFID, EU, Nordics, Netherlands) with home 
constituencies backing micro credit but the best channels to the Somaliland entities may well 
be NGOs with experience in Somaliland and (not necessarily in Somaliland) with 
microcredit. Direct NGO or state entity - let alone donor - lending is unlikely for several 
reasons, including cost and recovery for recycling, to be sustainable.
To implement several of these projects a strategy on users o f food aid is needed Somaliland - 
except in drought years - can be self sufficient in maize and sorghum so that food aid 
depresses prices and agro-pastoral incomes. It is not and is unlikely ever to be self sufficient 
in sugar, cooking oil or wheat - wheat flour - pasta. (While one can argue wheat is not 
essential it is and will remain widely consumed and imported as, to a lesser extent, will rice.) 
Logically food aid would be in the form of wheat-sugar-oil sold to the domestic distribution 
system with wages paid to work for food project participants. There is a perfectly good 
commercial system for buying-selling food if purchasing power is there. For some donors 
(e.g. USAID, EU) this is possibly but WFP operates under donor constraints. However, it 
can pay in wheat flow-sugar-oil-rice and workers can then on sell to rebalance food supply 
and dietory patterns which is not practicable (or higher transaction cost to workers) with 
maize, sorghum or undesired varieties of beans.
Reflections
It would be tempting to add to the foregoing list of articulated problems and priorities. But to 
do so without comparable deletions and a case that the substitutes are more important (or 
more urgent in terms of reducing major risks or opening up future prospects) would be to 
miss the point of priorities, sequences and macro economics. Resources are limited. How 
much can be done at any one time is limited. Future possibilities depend on present actions 
leading to high future resource flows. Most economic (as well as social and political) sectors 
are interrelated so that the secondary effects of actions and events (for good or for ill) are 
important and need to be analysed before acting as - where possible - in relation to probable 
future events. Applied macro economics is primarily a framework for such analysis to 
inform policy decisions (of enterprises, the social sector and in some cases households as 
well as the state).
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Macro economics cannot answer moral, social and/or political issues. It can throw light on 
some aspects o f them and indicate the parameters within which choices are possible.
A major example may be styled -  in nominative terms -  the Khatt question. Khatt is a 
moral issue because it would appear to be forbidden by the Holy Koran and inconsistent with 
most interpretations o f historic Somali social codes and practices. It is a household issue 
because it provides the largest component of agro pastoralist cash incomes, but also the 
largest component o f agro pastoralist and urban consumption and in non drought years is 
arguably the dominant cause o f household poverty . Because it is imported, it is the largest 
user of export and remittance earnings but also the largest single source of state tax revenue.
It is a political issue because Barre’s destruction of Somaliland Khatt farms in the early 
1980’s was a basic element in delegitimising and raising hostility toward his regime.
It is not a macro economist’s business as such to provide moral and theological or social and
)
political answers. But because Khatt costs consumers about $250 million ($150 million 
imports, $50 million to farmers, $40 million to commerce, $8-10 million tax to state) or $5 
per user day of 2 bunches it represents over a quarter of consumption (a much higher share 
than tobacco, alcohol and gambling in -  say -  the UK) it must be taken seriously by macro 
economic analysis.
That fact is reinforced because the physical effects of Khatt are negative in respect to 
productivity just as its financial impact is negative in respect to poverty and -  presumably — 
savings/investment and its use o f import capacity to roam for more investment and 
construction goods imports. It is no business of macro economics to judge amenity 
consumption as such, but it is valid to say that when viewed by consumers/users as a 
necessity it (whether Khatt or cocaine, gambling or cigarettes, beer or raki) contributes to 
poverty by squeezing objectively necessary household consumption. Khatt is mildly 
addictive physically but more so psychologically and not clearly permanently health or life 
impairing (unlike cigarettes). But it does require several hours to enjoy and its course o f mild 
exhilaration followed by sleepiness and then by lassitude the next morning reduces hours 
worked and output per hour worked. In a poor country it is important to pose the question to 
society to what degree this loss of potential output can be afforded.
Macro Economic Contributions to ‘Non Economic’ Questions
Banning use/uprooting farms is fairly self evidently unlikely to work and will result in armed 
criminal activity (macro economically just as undesirable as socially and politically).
Effective taxation o f all imported Khatt (and a tax per ten plants on domestic growers) 
collected efficiently and at the actual exchange rate could yield $30-50 million ($40-65 
million including domestic). It is tempting to argue that taxation would both cut use and 
finance basic services but that is probably somewhat dishonest. Demand for Khatt (as for 
cigarettes and -  in other societies -  alcohol) is inelastic i.e. higher prices are slow to erode it. 
Before consumption was cut significantly armed gunmen protected smuggling/producing 
would become rampant so neither much revenue nor much consumption reduction would 
result.
If Khatt consumption is to be reduced, it is necessary to explore alternative agro pastoral 
income generation opportunities as well as alternative revenue sources (probably easier as all 
imports can be taxed and less Khatt imports means more other imports). The two bases for 
effective challenges -  via social ethics and acceptable conduct perception changes -  are Islam 
(Sheiks who perceive its use as inconsistent with the Holy Koran) and women’s groups (who 
inter alia see its effect on draining away money needed for food and child support budgets). 
Some employers -  whether because of observing the greater absenteeism and/or lower 
productivity associated with Khatt or because of personal conviction or both -- have moved to 
hiring only non-Khatt users. That too is a valid way forward which in the short term has the 
useful side effect o f enhancing employment opportunities for women. Combined these 
constitute a potentially viable approach -  perceptions on cigarettes (as many diaspora 
Somalis know from experience) have shifted negatively in the north even without any strong 
religious element. In the meantime macro economics should take account o f the Khatt sector 
as it is and fiscal policy of the existing tax potential (since taxes will hardly increase use 
even if they do not reduce it much). Whether agricultural extension should help Khatt 
farmers (usually middle or larger farm agro pastoralists because o f the investment cost 
including planting and waiting and the clear land for water flow requirements of the crop) 
grow more, better is a more vexed question. It would raise rural incomes and reduce imports 
(so far so good) but would also represent official endorsement (arguably undesirable). The 
answer to that conundrum is ethical and political not macro-economic. As is perhaps evident 
the author as a macro political economist is deeply concerned by the higher poverty and 
lower productivity results of Khatt. He is also convinced as an analyst that legal prohibition 
and the use o f force to back it would be counterproductive. As a person he endorses use of
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IIslamic and women’s group dialogue and discourse to reduce consumption allied to 
encouraging employers to consider whether perfectly legitimate productivity (and therefore 
cost) considerations point to hiring only non users (and certainly banning use at workplace).
A very different case is the primarily political question of formal recognition of the 
Republic o f Somaliland. The basic case for recognition is moral and political with security 
and self respect the dominant issues. However, macro economics does have something to say 
about the costs o f non-recognition and the partial steps towards recognition which would 
reduce these costs (and perhaps set in train a sequence of actions and relationships leading to 
full recognition).
Non-recognition has meant exclusion of Somaliland from regional technical bodies -  e.g. 
under IGAD. In the case o f veterinary professionals this has clearly hampered setting up 
agreed veterinary (and zooinosis prevention) regimes and resolution of false claims as to 
diseases present (or not present) in Somaliland. Had a Red Sea -  East Africa body existed, 
the Saudi ban could probably have been averted or, at the least, raised sooner.
The categorisation of Somaliland as stage 4 Security by the UN -  apart from its patent 
falseness and demeaningness in respect to most of the country -  results in limiting the type o f 
UN Agency work allowable and in, at the least, encouraging bilateral agencies to adopt 
similar restrictions. Only UNHCR, UNICEF and UNCTAD have what amount to fully 
fledged, developmental country programmes.
Non recognition creates barriers to using government to government channels. While on 
occasion this can be side-stepped by using ‘autonomous agencies -  e.g. Port Authority, 
Customs Authority -  it usually leads to overconcentration on short term humanitarian and 
NGO (and secondarily domestic NGO) channelling. That fragments, prevents national 
coordination and prioritisation, enhances dependence and limits state and public service 
capacity building. It also limits net transfers. As a poor country recovering from war with
2,000,000 people Somaliland might expect to receive at least $50 to $60 million of imported 
inputs, domestic purchases, local hires and cash transfers to public sector budgets. In fact it 
receives under half that much. True this is distinctly smaller than the
unsubsidised/uncollected tax fiscal gap or the limited success in transmuting remittances and 
diaspora capital into productive investment but it is a not inconsiderable sum.
A series of steps less than full recognition could reduce these costs:
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a. reducing Hargeisa’s (and most other areas’) UN Security ratings to Stage 2;
b. handling Somaliland relations via Addis Ababa or Djibouti embassies/offices not Nairobi 
and, thereby separating them from Somalia and issues specific to that territorial unit (a 
step already taken by the UK, the USA and UNHCR);
c. achieving a status which the EU describes as a ‘region’ - i.e. a federal/confederal state or 
province - which does allow intergovernmental contact and contract;
d. using joint approaches with neighbours (e.g. Ethiopia) with specific mutual interests (e.g. 
Berbera Port and Berbera — Hoi Hoi highway) to unlock funds and contacts (in this case 
EU regional -  i.e. two or more state -  funds for the Horn) and access to professional 
bodies (e.g. in veterinary Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya as well as Ethiopia have an interest in a 
joint technical level official body with Saudi, Yemen and perhaps Oman, UAL, Kuwait).
These steps do not add up to full recognition -  albeit in sum they would make de facto  
recognition relatively likely to follow. They would reduce the present non-recognition costs 
substantially.
Macro economics can throw this much light on costs of non-recognition and the 
economically priority aspects o f recognition. It cannot provide a full political frame nor a full 
prioritised strategy. But the steps it suggests are economically key seem likely to set in train 
patterns o f contact and of relationships conducive to the broader objective. Again it is 
presumably evident that the author as a person advocates prompt full de jure  recognition of 
the Republic o f Somaliland. As a macro economist he sees non recognition as damaging to 
Somalia and, at least marginally to those of international agencies and foreign governments. 
As an analyst he considers the so-called Act of Union to be void ab initio (referendum defeat 
in Somaliland, High Court ruling rejecting treason charge) and the 1964 OAU declaration 
properly interpreted as in favour of colonial boundaries at independence and against coerced 
incorporation thus basically pro - not anti- Somaliland recognition since the ‘enemy’ to OAU 
was the 5 Star Flag of the URS and its explicit claim to Northwest Kenya, Region 5 and 
Djibouti. As a person he is appalled at non recognition of a state which has gone far toward 
restoring peace, security, nationhood and economic livelihood and is seeking to address basic 
services, reintegration and poverty issues. Plenty of states -  not only in Africa -  have done 
less and many -  in the Pacific, Caribbean and Latin America as well as Africa -  have 2 
million or fewer residents.
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IANNEX A 
Population Estimate
(Suppressed) 1986 1.65 to 1.75
Swedish Census 1 
Correction .174 .20
1986-90
Normal .25 .30
War Loss 4 (.1825) (.20)
31-XII-90 5 1.90 to 2.05
1998 vs. 1986
Refugees Ethiopia 6 (.15) (.15)
Other Refugees 7 } (.20) (.20)
Working Diaspora 7 }
1.55 to 1.70
1991-98
o
Population Growth .40 .425
Estimated Somali and 
Territorial Population 
31-XII-90 1.95 to 2.125
Notes
(All numbers rounded to stress approximation of method)
1. The draft census showed 5.5 to 5.8 million about 30% in then provinces now constituting 
Somaliland.
2. Probable undercount related to unrest and mutual Somalilander/URS distrust.
3. 15% over 4 years.
4. 10% over 4 years on basis analogous to Mozambique 1982-92 estimates.
5. Not adjusted for refugees and overseas contract workers and medium to long term
diaspora.
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6. Best guess adjusting for Somalia and Region 5 Somalis in camps and households in 
course of return to Somaliland but using refugee camps as source of working capital from 
rations and a place o f shelter during process.
7. Treated together. Guesstimate. Numbers have risen substantially (as have remittances) 
but neither actual sample census nor division between Somaliland and Somalia exist.
8. Estimated at 25% of adjusted 1-1-1991 population. Any estimate between 20% and 30% 
reasonable because post-war disruption lowers birth and raises death rates but desire to 
replace lost family members augments birth rates.
9. This excludes refugees, overseas term workers and diaspora seeing selves as 
Somalilanders. These may total 600,000 (200,000, 150,000, 300,000 respectively).
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ANNEX B
Gross Territorial/National Product Magnitudes 
(1997-$000,000)
Livestock and Products
Export 1 95
Domestic 2 70
Agriculture -  Fishing -  Forestry
Khatt 3 50
Grain 4 22.5
Other crops ? 15
Fishing 6 5
Forestry 7 10
Industry -  Construction -  Mining 42.5
Manufacturing/
Repairs 8 15
Construction 9 25
Mining/
Quarrying 10 2.5
Utilities -  Services
Water/
Electricity 11 5
Commerce/Hotel
Restaurant etc 12 225
Transport 13 65
Other private 14 5
Government 15 20
Gross Domestic Product
Remittances 16 500
Aid Transfers 17 25
165.0
102.5
320.0
630.0
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«Gross National Product/Income 1155
Per capita GDP
GNP
$325
$575
Uses
Private Consumption
State Consumption/Investment 18 50 (5%)
Household/Enterprise Investment 19105-160 (8-11%)
950-1000 (83-85%)
Notes
1. Value added in production. Adjusted to cover unrecorded or under-recorded exports. 
May include some Region 5 transit trade.
2. Perhaps 35-45 meat, 25-35 milk and ghee, 2.5-5 hides and skins.
3. Based on import estimates from sample survey of $150 million and rough estimate that 
domestic production is one quarter o f consumption.
4. Household study production data suggest 120,000 to 180,000 tonnes. National Ford 
Balance consumption estimates less grain imports suggest slightly over 150,000. Both 
include household production for own use. Much lower official estimates are de facto  
based on Barre period series which grossly underestimated household 
produced/consumed grain and Northwestern production in general.
5. E.g. citrus, watermelons, other fruit, vegetables, beans.
6. May be underestimate. Implies about 5,000 tonnes and assumes negligible export 
(prawn, shark fin).
7. Primarily charcoal plus building poles and beams. Includes gum Arabic and 
frankincense. May be underestimate.
8. Very rough guesstimate. Likely to be about half repairs.
9. Includes owner occupied/constructed housing labour input.
10. Basically sand/gravel for construction and artisanal salt pans.
11. Municipal and private water, private electricity.
12. Roughly estimated at 25% of production plus imports plus 10% transit commerce. Very 
rough order of magnitude estimate.
13. Includes transit traffic haulage. Value added basis. Could be overestimate but consistent
% with other low income, scattered SSA economies.
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14. Finance, telecoms etc.
15. Basically wages and salaries -  includes local government and payments to government 
staff by NGO and other external agencies for project services.
16. Based on 1998 sample survey is I. Ahmed.
17. On domestic purchases/transferred imports basis excluding external personnel (technical 
assistance or operations) payroll. That is standard GDP estimation method.
18. Perhaps 5 - 1 0  million investment.
19. Includes some aid investment in infrastructure, quick projects etc. Dominated by 
buildings.
External Accounts 1 
($000,000)
ANNEX C
Sources 700
Exports o f Goods 145
Livestock 2 120
Other 25
Exports of Services 30
Entrepot 30
Other Negl
Aid 25
Remittances 500
Uses 700
Imports of Goods 650
Khatt 3 150
Other 4 500
Imports o f Services 5 50
Notes
1. Grave doubts arise as to existing port and other border traffic data because o f a.) 
smuggling; b) difficulty of identifying Region 5 transit import/export data; c) under­
evaluation to lower tax or multiple exchange rate costs.
2. Ex port price not value to pastoralist valuation appearing in sectoral livestock GDP 
estimate.
3. Survey estimate -  twice officially recorded imports.
4. Perhaps 40% food, 10% fuel, 25% general consumer goods, 15% vehicles and machinery, 
5% building materials, 5% other.
5. Including enterprise and individual proprietor profit remittances.
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ANNEX D
Government 1 
(1997 $000,000)
Revenue 1997 Potential
Import Duties 17.5-22.5 115-140
Export Levies 6-7.5 -
License/
User Charges 6-7.5 20
Other Domestic 2-2.5 20-254
Aid 15-17.5 40-50
Total 50 170-225
Expenditure
Wages and Salaries 6 25 50-60
Other Recurrent 20 60-90
Capital 5 50-75
Total 50 160-225
Notes
1. Includes Central Government Budget (20-25), Local Government/Authorities (7.5-10), 
Aid in Kind/Monoraria channeled via Government but off budget (5), Aid projects 
closely coordinated with relevant sectoral ministry but NGO, UNHCR, ECHO or other 
agency funded/implemented. Very rough estimates.
2. Problem in guesstimation because some government revenue used on SS650 or S S I500 
$1 imports but much on SS3900 = $1 domestic payments and some revenue-spending 
handled on agency basis by Central Bank so off budget.
3. Collections do not reconcile with rates even if converted at $1 = SSI 500. Some may
have been used by Central Bank on agency basis in respect to uniformed service rations
and/or reduction of outstanding government borrowing from merchants.
<■* I ' *
4. Potential includes domestic Khatt (10), land and site rates for urban property (10).
5. Excluding external personnel, scholarships etc costs in respect to technical assistance and 
administration.
6. 1997 dominated by uniformed services rations.
7. Operating supplies, maintenance.
(Potential -  say 2002 -  explained in more detail in text.)
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